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ABSTRACT 




 This thesis analyses the relationship between ethical consumption and morality in 
a contemporary context of neoliberalism. Following Carrier (2012), ethical consumption 
is defined as an ambiguous mechanism through which social value and economic choice 
are brought together in order to affirm both. Tim Hortons’ (2012) Coffee Partnership 
Program, an initiative that takes place under the company’s “Making a True Difference” 
campaign, serves as a case study of the form that contemporary ethical consumption 
takes. Though theorists of risk society (Beck 1992, Giddens 1991) and governmentality 
(Rose 1999, Miller and Rose 1997) have argued that neoliberalism coincides with greater 
experiences of anxiety due to increased knowledge of risks and pressures of 
responsibilization, ethnographies of ethical consumers (such as Connolly and Prothero 
2008, Adams and Raisborough’s 2010) have indicated that ethical consumption tends to 
mitigate the anxieties associated with consuming by guaranteeing the sustainability of the 
commodity in question. I argue that by guaranteeing the extent to which a commodity is 
ethical, such consumption paradoxically lessens the extent to which individual consumers 
experience the psychic turmoil of social and political responsibility to others. I use the 
concept of “commodity fetishism” from Marx (1990 [1867]) nuanced with a 
contemporary psychoanalytic notion of fetishism (Edelman 2005 [2004], and Žižek 2006, 
2008, 2008 [1989], 2012) to explain the phenomenon of this mitigation.  
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1. Introduction 
 What follows is an attempt at thinking through the relationship of consumption to 
morality in a contemporary context of consumer culture characterized by the availability 
of so-called “ethical” commodities in a practice that has come to be known as “ethical 
consumption.” It ties together Marx’s (1990 [1867]) notion of commodity fetishism as 
the misapprehension of the source of an object’s value inherent in the social relations 
constituting capitalism and more recent psychoanalytic conceptions of the psychic role of 
the “fetish” in constituting stable narratives (both of the self and of history) by Edelman 
(2005 [2004]), and Žižek (2006, 2008, 2008 [1989], 2012). 
 I argue that by guaranteeing the extent to which a commodity is ethical, ethical 
consumption paradoxically lessens the extent to which individual consumers experience 
the psychic turmoil of social and political responsibility to others. Here, the “other” may 
be local, far away, or even a different species, kingdom, or other even other more general 
environmental concerns (e.g., biodiversity loss, climate change, water conservation, 
ecological devastation, etc.) (Carrier 2010). In order to illustrate the extent to which 
ethical consumption constitutes the conditions of possibility for this ethical tension, I will 
perform a textual analysis of the Canadian coffee purveyor, doughnut shop, and quick 
service restaurant Tim Hortons’ (2012) Coffee Partnership Program, part of their 
campaign to “Make a True Difference” in the lives of those with whom they interact. In 
so doing, I illustrate how the narratives of origin, partnership, sustainability, and ethics 
create the conditions of possibility for a potentially problematic discourse of moral self-
understanding.  
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1-1. Defining Ethical Consumption 
 Carrier (2012) refers to ethical consumption as any activity that attempts to bridge 
the gap between social value and economic practice, insofar as these two spheres of 
communal human activity are ever distinguishable from one another. This 
characterization of ethical consumption leaves intact the ambiguity implied by ethics, and 
as Carrier notes, even a practice as contemptible as the Nazi boycott of Jewish-made 
commodities would qualify as a form of ethical consumption; it is a choice made about 
consumption (i.e., to not consume) by reference to a social value (i.e., anti-Semitism). It 
is precisely because of this essential ambiguity that I will mobilize this broad definition. 
The ambiguity of this formulation opens up the possibility that historical (including 
current) forms of consumption that seem “ethical” to the present may, upon reflection or 
retroactively, be revealed as problematic, unethical, immoral, or even reprehensible. 
 This distinction between social value and the economy was perhaps rendered 
most palpable by Weber (2007 [1978]) in his analysis of the differences between ideal 
typical formulations of classes and status groups; whereas status groups are established 
upon historically-based estimations of the social value of prestige and thus belong to the 
sphere of meaningful social action, class refers to an estimation of life chances based 
upon the distribution of goods within society and tends to be an infrequent basis for 
social action. Class becomes a description of empirically observable and measurable 
indicators, and is not necessarily meaningful to a social agent. In this typology, class is 
indifferent to social value, leading to Weber’s (2007 [1978]) own interested ambivalence 
toward the “parvenu” or the “nouveau riche” in America: those people that have no 
historical precedent for the affluent life they enjoy, as they are not members of any 
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traditional status group and thus have no limits upon how they might enjoy that affluence. 
What is understood as contemporary ethical consumption, then, represents a renewed 
attempt at integrating social meaning within an economic system based on exchange. In 
particular, it refers to the attempt to make the assumed self-interest of individual 
consumption work for the social and/or global (or environmental and thereby social or 
global) whole. 
 Further still, Lewis and Potter (2011) delineate between ethical consumption and 
what has been called “political consumerism,” under which acts such as activism, 
boycotts, and consumer organizations form the basis of action. Lewis and Potter maintain 
that such a distinction is truly only sustainable in abstract, ideal types, as it is quite easy 
to see how the tactics and strategies of political consumerism influence the consumption 
practices of individual members (e.g., individual activists, boycotters, and concerned 
consumers). Again, political consumerism coincides with the Weber’s (2007 [1978]) 
formulation of the “party,” a group of people joined together for the sole purpose of 
exercising social action oriented toward the achievement of some goal (i.e., power). This 
complicates Carrier’s (2012) ambiguous definition of ethical consumption, and in 
particular his example of the Nazis’ boycott; the Nazis’ (a party) organized the boycott, 
but relied on individual members of the Volk (i.e., Germans) to comply (i.e., 
individualized responsibility). The distinction between party and status group here is 
instructive precisely because the choice to consume ethically tends to be formulated as an 
individual, autonomous choice. It is not the organization or orientation of an entire group 
(i.e., party) of concerned individual consumer/citizens around a particular cause or 
concern (Soper 206). 
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 It is around these distinctions, however untenable in practice, that contemporary 
ethical consumption is organized. Though the definition of what, exactly, constitutes 
ethical consumption is quite open, the practice is focused around the economic act of 
shopping, buying, and consuming in certain ways that may be informed by attempts at 
reintegrating either social ends or political goals to the economic exchange implied by 
individuals’ consumption. The restaurant franchise Tim Hortons’ (2012) “Making a True 
Difference” campaign is one such attempt. 
 
1-2. The Tim Hortons “Difference” 
 The following information about Tim Hortons has been assembled from its 
English-Canadian consumer website (www.timhortons.com/ca/en). Tim Hortons is a 
Canadian purveyor of coffee and doughnuts named after and founded in 1964 by famous 
Canadian hockey defenseman Tim Horton. Since its inception, it has become somewhat 
of a Canadian business champion, with more than 3 000 locations across Canada and 
over 600 locations in the Eastern United States, making it the largest quick service 
restaurant chain in Canada. It boasts that its Canadian operation is 95% franchise owned 
and operated, in order to lend credence to its claims of commitment to Canadian 
communities, citizens, and consumers alike. 
 In 2005, Tim Hortons launched its own foray into the ethical consumption 
landscape with its “Tim Hortons Coffee Partnership” program. In keeping with Carrier’s 
(2010) definition of ethical consumption, the Coffee Partnership program is concerned 
with not only social, but also environmental issues. Tim Hortons indicates that there are 
three key “pillars” to its Coffee Partnership program, namely: Pillar 1) “Economic: 
  5 
helping coffee farmers earn a better living by training them to be better farmers and run 
better businesses,” Pillar 2) “Social: empowering youth and improving education of the 
children of coffee farmers so they have the opportunity for a better future,” and Pillar 3) 
“Environmental: educating coffee farmers and helping them adopt more environmentally 
sound and sustainable farming practices” (Tim Hortons 2012). 
 Working together with the Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung (HRNS) Foundation, the 
Tri-National Comission of the Trifinio Plan (CTPT), and Junior Achievement (JA) in 
Guatemala, Tim Hortons touts that it has worked with over 3 400 farmers and influenced 
the lives of over 17 000 people in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
 Something distinct (or different, even) about Tim Hortons’ approach to their 
ethical consumption line of products is that the organization chose not to simply buy Fair 
Trade or Rainforest Alliance certified coffee (two established organizations that certify 
the social and environmental impacts of coffee production are within certain responsible 
and sustainable limits), opting instead to develop their own distinct criteria and brand in 
concert with the HRNS foundation, the CTPT, and JA, externally verified by Control 
Union Certifications (CUC), an independent third-party organization. 
 The fruit (or rather, the seed of the fruit) of this Coffee Partnership program has 
been Tim Hortons Partnership Blend Coffee. At $7.69 for 343 grams of fine ground 
coffee, the Partnership Blend is only $0.70 more expensive than Tim Hortons’ classic and 
instantly recognizable 343 gram can of fine ground coffee. Furthermore, of that $7.69, 
Tim Hortons advertises that $1.00 from every purchase of Partnership Blend Coffee goes 
to support the ongoing Coffee Partnership Program. Apart from creating its own criteria 
and guidelines for its Coffee Partnership program, it is this mediated appearance of the 
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direct exchange of consumption dollars to production benefits that sets Tim Hortons apart 
from some of the more abstract guarantees of some of the better-known fair trade 
organizations mentioned above.  
 In what follows, I will illustrate how the Tim Hortons Coffee Partnership program 
“fetishizes” its own historical context, its own business practices, and in fact this very 
campaign according to Marx’s (1990 [1867]) theory of “commodity fetishism,” in an 
effort to appeal to consumers’ moral sensibilities. Nuancing this theory of commodity 
fetishism with psychoanalytic notions of fetishism (Edelman (2005 [2004]), and Žižek 
2006, 2008, 2008 [1989], 2012), I contend that the monetary implication of the consumer 
purchasing the Partnership Blend Coffee operates in such a way as to make the consumer 
feel as if he or she is a “partner” in the program. The $1.00 from every purchase that 
funds the Coffee Partnership program becomes a kind of individual charity in and 
through the act of consumption, guaranteeing that good will come from the individual 
choice to consume better. I am here advancing a line of inquiry developed by Žižek 
(“RSA” 2009) in a discussion of Tom’s Shoes “One for One program (wherein for every 
pair of shoes you buy, Tom’s Shoes will give one pair to a child living in poverty), that 
“in the very consumerist act you buy your redemption from being a consumerist [sic]”; 
charity and vindication become internal to the cultural logic of capitalism. 
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2. Literature Review 
 In order to link the narrative of ethical consumption as it appears in the Tim 
Hortons “Make A True Difference” campaign to the moral self-identity of the consumer 
subject, it is necessary for me to being with a discussion of how “ethical consumption” is 
currently conceived in relation to current literature. More specifically, I will refer to two 
conceptual and theoretical literatures and the recent existing literature on ethical 
consumption in the context of neoliberalism. The first (2-1) conceptual literature is 
organized around Marx’s (1990 [1867]) notion of “commodity fetishism”. The second (2-
2) conceptual literature will be that organized around a contemporary psychoanalytic 
notion of the “fetish” as it arises in the works of Žižek (2006, 2008, 2008 [1989], 2012) 
and Edelman (2005 [2004]). I will flesh out these conceptual definitions prior to turning 
to a review of the contemporary literature on the current historical context of ethical 
consumption (2-3) as a way of framing the textual analysis and that will follow. 
 
2-1. Commodity Fetishism 
 My review of the literature on commodity fetishism will consist of the primary 
material from Marx’s Capital, and interpretations and nuances of this concept by Žižek 
(2006, 2009), as well as the way that this concept has been operationalized within the 
context of ethical consumption, especially Carrier (2010) and Barnett and his colleagues 
(2005). 
 In Volume I of Capital, very early in the unfolding of his critique of political 
economy, Marx illuminates what he calls “commodity fetishism” (1990 [1867]: 163). His 
analysis of the commodity form and its primacy in capitalism has been tremendously 
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influential in critical analyses of culture and capitalism since its initial formulation. In a 
short section in the first chapter (“The Commodity”) of the first volume Capital, Marx 
(1990 [1867]) makes a very precise point about the appearance of the value of 
commodities: that the relation of value between commodities in capitalism is an 
obfuscation of their essentially social production (and of the extractive features of that 
production). Following from Marx, I define “commodity fetishism” as the description of 
a byproduct of the social relations of production under capitalism characterized by the 
misrecognition of exchange-value as stemming from some innate value of the object (i.e., 
the commodity) itself. What follows demonstrates both the form that this misrecognition 
takes as well as the actual source of value in the social relations of production under 
capitalism according to Marx. 
 Marx’s analysis of this relationship between commodities follows a very 
systematic trajectory, but at the outset he mentions, in passing, that though “[a] 
commodity appears at first sight an obvious, trivial thing… its analysis brings out that it 
is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” 
(Marx 1990 [1867]: 163). In order to situate my analysis of ethical consumption within a 
discussion of Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism, I will perform my own brief 
exegesis of this oft-cited passage from Capital: “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its 
Secret” (Marx 1990 [1867]: 163). 
 While from the current historical context, a phrase like “commodity fetishism” 
seems to refer to the power that the commodity wields over the consumer, this is not the 
case per se. Marx is here not concerned with the “worship” of commodities associated 
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with more recent popular critiques of capitalism, though the case could be made that such 
an interpretation is made possible through extrapolation.  
 Speaking as if he were a commodity, Marx asserts, “our use-value may interest 
men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, 
is our value. Our own interest as commodities proves it. We relate to each other merely as 
exchange-values” (1990 [1867]: 177). The irony implied by the anthropomorphising of 
the commodity by forcing it to speak for itself and its comrades would be exactly Marx’s 
goal in this excerpt; he states that commodity fetishism “reflects the social relation of the 
producers to the sum total of labor as a social relation between objects, a relation which 
exists apart and outside the producers” (1990 [1867]: 165), as if the objects themselves 
had the meaningful relationships with one another and not the objects to the human 
beings that created them. Marx’s concern is precisely the anthropomorphism of 
commodities: the way that the relation between commodities (i.e., their exchange-values) 
appears to be a social relation between commodities in capitalism, when this is not the 
case. Each of Marx’s terms (i.e., use-values, exchange-value, and value) has a very 
precise definition in his economic analysis.  
 Use-value refers to the qualitative characters of an object itself: its sensuousness, 
its material composition, and most apparently, its usefulness as a material object (e.g., a 
chair is useful for sitting on) (Marx 1990 [1867]: 163). Further, “use-values are 
realized… in consumption” (Marx 1990 [1867]: 126), increasing the relevance of their 
elaboration to a critique of consumer culture (i.e., since use-values are realized in 
consumption, they are relevant to consumers). This is not the form of value with which 
Marx is primarily concerned, since, as it will become more evident, Marx is concerned 
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with the source of an objects’ value, which he takes to be social labor. Early in Capital, 
Marx acts as if commodities are physical objects whose “usefulness does not dangle in 
mid-air” (1990 [1867]: 126), betraying the materialist bias of his notion of 
“commodities.” However, commodities (or aspects thereof) need not be physically or 
materially useful; they may be psychologically useful (either instead or as well). 
 Exchange-value (incisively) refers to the quantitative matrix of exchange 
according to some magnitude of valuation (i.e., quantified social labour). While at first 
glance exchange-value “appears… as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which 
use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind,” Marx dismisses this 
interpretation simply by indicating toward the observation of varying exchange-values 
across space and time (1990 [1867]: 126). The exchange-value of the commodity must 
have some common denominator that determines its magnitude; disregarding use-value, 
because Marx has eliminated it as the real source of “value” of the object, only abstract 
human social labor remains.  
 In Marx’s formulation, a commodity’s exchange-value does not come from its 
use-value, but instead through its value “determined by the quantity of labor expended to 
produce it” in a highly abstract sense as “the total labor-power of society… composed of 
innumerable individual units of labor-power” (1990 [1867]: 129). Therefore, exchange-
value is derived from “socially necessary labor-time,” or “the labor time which is 
necessary on an average… under the conditions of production normal for a given society 
and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labor prevalent in that society” 
(Marx 1990 [1867]: 129). The only relation between exchange-value and use-value is that 
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in order for a commodity to have an exchange-value, it must have a use-value for a future 
consumer. 
 In a sense, the fetishism of commodities refers to the initial formulation of 
exchange-value immediately dismissed by Marx: that some quality of the commodity 
itself (i.e., use-value) determines the quantity of its value relative to other commodities 
(i.e., exchange-value). This rejected formulation could resemble the following 
(temporalized) equation: 
 1) use-value (= value as some measurable element of the object) → exchange-
 value 
Marx maintains that this formulation is the misunderstanding that characterizes the 
fetishism of commodities. Instead, Marx asserts that the real source of exchange-value is 
socially necessary labor time, i.e.,: 
 2) value (i.e. labor time) (+ the production of some qualitative use-value) → 
 exchange-value 
In this second (2) formulation, use-value is merely the quality that realizes the magnitude 
of value. Use-value’s only function in commodity production – though necessary – is as a 
kind of binary on-off switch for value to become exchange-value, not as the determiner 
of exchange-value itself. 
 Though the commodity is not a form of value and/or product of labor unique to 
capitalism, it is only in capitalism that commodity production becomes the primary mode 
of production. The distinction between commodities and other products of labor is that 
commodities are produced for their exchange-value. They are not produced for their use-
value, even if they must necessarily have some useful quality. Marx’s critique of the 
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production of commodities for exchange goes on to focus on the creation of the surplus-
value that will inevitably create profit for those who own the means of production (i.e., 
capitalists). Though this dynamic remains vitally important to understanding the 
persistent inegalitarian global distribution of the means of production (capital, including 
money), it is not immediately relevant to an understanding of the individual consumer’s 
psychic (or lack-thereof) relation to the commodity. 
 The notion of socially necessary labor power determining the value of a 
commodity may seem to fly in the face of the received economic wisdom that fluctuating 
market prices in a consumer capitalist context are the effects of shifts in “supply and 
demand,” but it is a basic tenet of Marxian thought. After all, the particular relationship 
of consumers to commodities is through the act of exchange (i.e., consumption, through a 
medium of exchange like money), not necessarily through the commodities’ direct 
production. This distinction is only possible in the abstract: an abstract consumer relates 
to commodities through consumption, whereas in reality, consumers are people with jobs 
(i.e., producers). This understanding maintains a sharp distinction between producers and 
consumers (without, for the moment, implicating capitalists, themselves often touted as 
the real “job creators” and “producers” through their mobilization of capital in the service 
of commodity production). However, this vulgar binary understanding of consumption as 
a primarily exchange-oriented relationship to commodities obscures the generative power 
mobilized by consumers and the historical emergence of consumer culture as that which 
is produced by the emergence of consumption as both a historically contingent tendency 
of capitalism (as it has unfolded) and a possibility within the structures of capitalism.  
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 In the Marxian formulation, the consumer’s relation to the commodity is primarily 
through its appearance as an object of exchange. Most important to the Marxian 
formulation of commodity fetishism is that fetishism does not end by demystifying the 
fetish character by exposing the hidden abstract human social labor constituting the 
commodity. Commodity fetishism is internal to the very mechanisms and social relations 
of capitalism, or as Žižek puts it, “commodity fetishism… is not located in our mind, in 
the way we (mis)perceive reality, but in our social reality itself” (2006:94). As long as 
there are commodities, there is the appearance of a separate and distinct relation between 
these objects. A world without commodity fetishism is not a world without fetishism, but 
indeed and only a world without the commodity form. 
 Further, since Marx is strictly describing an ontological reality of life in 
capitalism, there is nothing necessarily “normative” in any moral sense about commodity 
fetishism: commodity fetishism is the description of (misperceived) social relations, not a 
“belief” with moral repercussions. Though Marx is highly critical of the general social 
relations of production under capitalism and the more specific, local, and undeniably 
atrocious working conditions of the European proletariat in the 1800s, there is nothing 
connoting being “bad” per se for being a victim of commodity fetishism (or even a notion 
of being a “victim” or “perpetrator” of commodity fetishism). Commodity fetishism is 
the inevitable outcome of social relations, not an indication of the moral status of the 
subjects implicated within those relations. The communist telos of Marx’s writings 
pertains to capitalist totality as a fundamentally unjust distribution of the means of 
production. To be able to see commodities as they really are, “as a simple embodiment of 
social relations between people,” is not a more highly valued subject position, because 
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“by means of your participation in social exchange, you bear witness to the uncanny fact 
that a commodity really appears to you as a magical object endowed with special powers” 
(Žižek 2006, 94). Ultimately, there is no subject “outside” commodity fetishism; seeing 
“through” the fetishism does not eliminate the material social relations leading to 
fetishism in the first place, that is, the universalization of the commodity form itself. 
 This reality stands in sharp contrast to the task taken up by geography according 
to Barnett et. al. (2005), who conceive of the role of geography being that of generating 
“knowledge of chains of consequences” in the consumption of commodities. Barnett et 
al. contend that: 
 critical accounts of the politics of commodification rest on an analytics of mis-
 recognition, according to which responsible action requires the development of 
 geographical imaginations, or cognitive maps, that connect spatially and 
 temporally distanciated actions and consequences through the provision of 
 explanatory knowledge. (2005: 25-26) 
In their formulation, geographers assign themselves the task of demystifying or revealing 
the hidden steps the commodity production chain in order to map and identify those 
processes that are obscured by the reality of commodity fetishism. This understanding of 
the task of geography would amount to, for Žižek, a deceptive lure to see oneself outside 
of the social relations constituting that chain of consequences. 
 Carrier (2010) identifies at least three (3) different ways that this notion of the 
misrecognition of commodity fetishism conceals the social production of an ethical 
commodity, namely by concealing: 1) the creation of the object itself; 2) the conditions 
under which the commodity is purchased or enjoyed (i.e., consumed), and; 3) the natural 
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environment from which the commodity was extracted. In the first form, the object is 
removed from the context in which it was produced, leading to the misrecognition of the 
object as possessing ethical qualities itself. This is perhaps the most basic form of 
commodity fetishism, but Carrier (2010) extends the notion to refer not only to the 
object’s exchange-value, but also to its capacity to render the “ethical” intelligible. In the 
second, any steps taken by the consumer toward the eventual enjoyment of the object are 
obscured in the moment of purchase (e.g., taking a plane to get to an eco-tourist resort). 
Finally, the third modality of fetishism presents the environment (from which the 
commodity is extracted or even the environment turned into a commodity itself, as in 
eco-tourism) as “natural,” untouched, or renewed (Carrier 2010). 
 This sentiment is expanded upon by Coles and Crang (2011) in their concept of 
narrative of origins as a “double commodity fetish” (2012: 89). They show how in many 
cases of ethical consumption, the narrative of the origin of the commodity becomes part 
of what is sold. This is the case with the Tim Hortons Partnership Blend of coffee; part of 
the advertising strategy is to emphasize the origins of the coffees in the blend. In so 
doing, ethical consumption turns that narrative of origin in to a part of the commodity 
itself (Coles and Crang 2011), thus resulting in a double fetish. 
 However, the argument, according to the Žižekian (2006) interpretation of 
commodity fetishism, is precisely that this sort of cognitive mapping that attempts to 
trace the consequences and sources of commodity production does not “solve” 
commodity fetishism even if it does manage to demystify the fetishism of a particular 
commodity. Furthermore, Žižek (2009) maintains that  
 Marx’s classic notion of commodity fetishism in which ‘relations between people’  
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 assume the form of ‘relations between things’ has thus to be radically re-thought: 
 in ‘immaterial labour,’ ‘relations between people’ are ‘not so much hidden 
 beneath the veneer of objectivity, but are themselves the very material of our 
 everyday exploitation.’ (139) 
According to this account of fetishism, commodities are not simply social labor taking 
the form of exchange-value in some material commodity. Instead, as is the case in service 
economies that rely in large part on consumers, ‘immaterial labor,’ or labor that does not 
produce some material object as its end, implicates the social relations between humans 
themselves. Thus, when Tim Hortons’ Partnership Program proclaims its relationships to 
the consumer and the growers alike, this relationship takes on a mediated immaterial 
dimension that hides the form that those relations take. 
 
2-2. Fetishism and the Ethical Void 
 Following Žižek, I argue that the attempts to reveal the political economy of any 
one, particular commodity, while informative, do not demystify the fetishism intrinsic to 
the social relations of production in capitalism. Further still, this singular and particular 
interpretation of the word “fetish” does not fully capture the potential psychic or 
cognitive implications of consumption for any one consumer. Either of the Marxian or 
the Žižekian interpretations of commodity fetishism specifically are, in fact, indifferent to 
the cognitive status of the consumer: for Marx, knowledge of commodity fetishism is 
only possible in the abstract, and for Žižek, more strongly, knowledge of commodity 
fetishism amounts to a deceptive lure. 
  17 
 This second notion of commodity fetishism is influenced by psychoanalytic 
notions of sexual fetishism found originally in Freud and elaborated upon by Lacan; 
Edelman (2005 [2004]) and Žižek (2006, 2008, 2008 [1989], 2012) have between them 
elaborated a contemporary notion of “fetishism” drawing from these two original sources 
that I will use to nuance the more rigidly defined “commodity fetishism.” I do so in order 
to construct or contribute to a notion of fetishism that includes an account of the psychic 
function of the fetish as a guarantor for action. The distinction that I am making here is 
between describing a historical context and positing the kinds of consciousness that such 
a context makes possible; I am theorizing ethical consumer consciousness, not simply the 
historical context of ethical consumption, though an account of such a context will 
become necessary in order to situate consciousness within historical (social and cultural) 
conditions of possibility. 
 Whereas Marxian commodity fetishism persists as part of the social reality of 
capitalism even when its specific conditions are more or less known, psychoanalytic 
fetishism constitutes “a refusal to know” (Cluley and Dunne 2012: 256). Žižek 
summarizes the differences between Marxian and psychoanalytic conceptions of 
fetishism, writing “in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive network of social relations, 
whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack (‘castration’) around which the symbolic 
network is articulated” (2008 [1989]: 50). Robert Cluley and Stephen Dunne, citing Žižek 
(amongst others), refer to this form of fetishism as an “as if” moment: consumers “often 
act as if they did not know what they know only all too well, namely, that the consumed 
commodity may not have been the best possible choice” (2012: 254). Fetishism 
understood this way introduces the psychic distinction between “knowing” and “wanting 
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to know,” where “I know, but I don’t want to know that I know, so I don’t know” or “I 
know it, but I refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that I can 
continue acting as if I don’t know it” (Žižek 2008: 53). This disavowal is the form that 
fetishism takes in Žižek: Truth becomes subject to desire in such a way that one can act 
as if the actual state of affairs were not the case. 
 Lee Edelman’s (2005 [2004]) No Future is a psychoanalytic analysis of (and 
queer political polemic against) what he has termed “reproductive futurism.” In his 
analysis, Edelman takes issue with the “reproductive futurism” of American political 
discourse, wherein both the figure of “the Child” and the capacity for human 
reproduction remain cornerstones of the promise of the nation’s (or even humanity’s) 
future (2005:2). His analysis is pertinent precisely because it attempts to politicize a 
discourse that has been depoliticized (i.e., the sanctity of childhood) in a way similar to 
how ethical consumption attempts to depoliticize consumer ethics. Following Edelman, I 
argue that ethical consumer consciousness may be similarly characterized by what I will 
call “consumptive futurism,” a commitment to the psychic fetish function of the ethical 
commodity. 
 In Edelman’s (2005 [2004]) argument, children become the agents that “secure” 
the meaningfulness of the future. Against this uncontested logic of reproductive futurism, 
Edelman proposes “a queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural 
determinants of politics as such, which is to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of 
opposition” (2005 [2004], 4). Practically speaking, Edelman’s polemic is against the 
coordinates of the polemic constituting the American belief in the promise of human 
reproduction. Against an uncontested logic of reproduction, one must choose the 
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unchoosable choice: to not reproduce. Edelman maintains that his “queer” “paradoxical 
formulation suggests a refusal – the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes 
queer theory – of every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally 
defined, and, by extension, of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in 
which meaning succeeds in revealing itself – as itself – through time” (2005:4). This 
queer reading is opposed to a more standard, heteronormative construction of the 
function of sex as reproduction, and indeed flies in the face of a logic of reproducing the 
family even within a same-sex relationship.  
 As I would have it put, “consumptive futurism,” derived from the logic of 
Edelman’s (2005) “reproductive futurism,” similarly orients consumer practices toward 
the notion that ethical consumption is an uncontestable means through which the 
meaningfulness of the future (i.e., social and environmental value) is secured. In the place 
of the Child, consumptive futurism places the Commodity (i.e., the consumer 
commodity). The capitalization of the “c” in “Commodity” in this case connotes its 
figural function as the guarantor of symbolization associated with the Lacanian “big 
Other” in the same sense as Edelman’s “Child”; the “future” becomes intelligible only 
through its symbolization rendered possible by an experience mediated through 
commodity consumption. 
 The ethical commodity is related to “consumptive futurism” in the sense implied 
by Lacan’s inversion of Dostoyevski: 
  As you know, the father Karamazov’s son Ivan leads the latter into those 
 audacious avenues taken by the thought of the cultivated man, and in particular, 
 he says, if God doesn’t exist… – If God doesn’t exist, the father says, then 
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 everything is permitted. Quite evidently, a naïve notion, for we analysts know full 
 well that if God doesn’t exist, then nothing at all is permitted any longer. 
 Neurotics prove that to us every day. (Cited in Žižek 2006: 91) 
Because there is a figural guarantor for action (the Father, God, Lacan’s big Other, the 
Child, the Commodity, etc.), one may act in certain ways. It is only when this fetish 
object is “revealed” or experienced as the lack of symbolic guarantees itself (insofar as 
that is possible) that nothing is permitted and rather “everything is prohibited” (Žižek 
2006: 92). Ethical consumption attempts to circumvent the problem of the as if moment 
of consumption by providing a figural guarantee that the consumption taking place is of 
an ethical character. 
 There is a set of literatures about ethical consumption that attempt to create a 
theoretical distinction between the moral and the ethical implications of consumption. 
The ethnographic research conducted by Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler (2010) on the 
narratives espoused by enthusiasts and critics of the sports utility vehicle (SUV) 
“Hummer” (incisively titled “Consumer Identity Work as Moral Protagonism: How Myth 
and Ideology Animate a Brand-Mediated Moral Conflict”) reveals the dynamics of 
fetishism and disavowal present in many justifications for adopting a certain type of 
consumption over another (2010). Hummer enthusiasts were capable of framing their 
consumption choices within the context of preserving and enjoying nature. Their 
respondent Robert, for example, paraphrased that 
 My whole family’s religious conviction is to go out in the world and enjoying its 
 ambience. And this Jeep allows me to get to places where I will never get 
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 otherwise. Some of these are pretty magnificent places. And you’ll never see 
 them. (Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler 2010: 66) 
Robert is able to frame his SUV lifestyle as a choice that actually brings him closer to 
nature; he is able to disavow the hydrocarbons that his consumption is responsible for 
emitting by choosing to focus on the social meaning that his consumption choice 
generates for him and his family (Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler 2010). 
 Although there is a noted (by Connolly and Prothero 2008, Adams and 
Raisborough 2010) lack of ethnographic research engaging directly with ethical 
consumers attitudes toward their own consumption choices (either individuals that may 
choose to consume ethically or individuals that identify as “ethical consumers”), there is 
an empirical precedent for including a discussion of fetishism as an object that conceals 
the void implied by ethical responsibility by guaranteeing the object’s its moral value. In 
Connolly and Prothero’s (2008) study of green consumption, they noted respondents 
“moralizing tendency” to articulate their own consumption choices in relation to some 
“other consumption” that was worse. Pleasure was taken in maintaining one’s identity as 
a green consumer outside of a posited “mainstream culture” of this “other consumption.” 
Whereas respondents articulated ambivalence toward the times they were forced to 
consume unethically or against their green convictions, they did not articulate the same 
ambivalence in regards to their environmental practices (Connolly and Prothero 2008). 
 Observing a similar tendency to that found in Connolly and Prothero’s 
ethnography, Adams and Raisborough’s (2010) discuss consumers’ experiences of their 
own ethical consumption practices. Adams and Raisborough’s research indicates 
“correspondents talked about being ethical or ‘making a difference’ through consumption 
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in terms of trying to be or do ‘good’” (261). Further, they suggest that their data indicates 
that the conflation of “doing good” with Fairtrade products, for example, obviates the 
reflexivity required by ethical choices.  
 Such practices coincide with Soper’s (2007) contention that ethical consumption 
has moral rewards. She argues that such moral rewards include the “sensual pleasures of 
consuming differently” (211) and “a distinctly moral form of self-pleasuring or a self-
interested form of altruism: that which takes pleasure in committing to a more socially 
accountable mode of consuming” (213). Soper (2007) refers to this tension as “alternate 
hedonism.” 
 Soper’s (2007) concept of “alternate hedonism” attempts to blur the assumed line 
between self-interest and social responsibility implied by ethical consumption by pointing 
to all of the different ways in which self-interest and altruism interact within a social 
context. According to Soper, alternate hedonism “distinguishes between the sensual 
pleasures and the moral rewards of consuming sustainably, and at the same time 
recognizes the extent to which these differing motives and gratifications may come 
together or be over-determining in the case of ethical or ‘virtuous’ consumption” (212). 
Soper’s concept helps to understand how an “egoistic rationale for changing consumption 
will very often, one suspects, be coloured by something more altruistic, and vice-versa” 
(213). Thus it becomes extremely difficult in a social context to distinguish “morality” as 
a social norm from “the moral” as a pleasure taken in self-judgment and self-
understanding. 
 It must be noted that the meanings of “moral” and “ethical” are themselves often 
conflated in much of the literature regarding ethical consmption. Ethics might, in a 
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Foucauldian sense, refer simply to practical choices about personal conduct (Barnett et. 
al. 2005: 28), or perhaps to a more radical ethics wherein “one acts from the position of 
the inexistence of the big Other, assuming the abyss of the act deprived of any guarantee 
of support” (Žižek 2012:118). These disparate notions of ethics may be contrasted yet 
again to a notion of “moral selving,” referring “to the mediated work of creating oneself 
as a more virtuous person through practices that acknowledge responsibilities to others” 
(Barnett et. al. 2005: 30). This process of “moral selving” is separate and distinct from 
either of the two proposed conceptions of ethics because of its emphasis on the basis for 
the judgment of an action, whereas the Foucauldian conception of ethics (in Barnett et al. 
2005) is practically indifferent (though not immune) to normative content and the 
Žižekian conception of ethics denies any basis for such a judgment. 
 Carrier’s (2010) concept of “ethicality” is a very fitting way to understand the 
function of the “fetish” in ethical consumption, but it stops short of positing a “void” 
between the object and the symbolic guarantee it makes possible. For Carrier (2010), the 
ethicality of an object refers to its capacity to render meaning legible at the conceptual 
level; the commodity becomes a signifier of the moral criteria it connotes (i.e., the 
signified). 
 The sense of moral certainty implied by “ethicality” corresponds to Žižek’s 
definition of cultural capitalism, wherein “[f]ar from being invisible, social relationality 
in its very fluidity is directly the object of marketing and exchange: in ‘cultural 
capitalism,’ one no longer sells (and buys) objects which ‘bring’ cultural or emotional 
experiences, one directly sells (and buys) such experiences” (2009: 139). The ethical 
relationships and responsibilities between producers, consumers, and business-owners 
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become the objects of exchange in ethical consumption. As a consumer, one buys an 
object that not only includes the experience of being a responsible moral (i.e., ethical as a 
fetish word) subject, but also or in fact, buys the experience of moral-selving. 
 This psychoanalytically nuanced notion of fetishism actually represents a return to 
a religious (or at least metaphysical) understanding of the fetish as an object that appears 
to have special powers (perhaps the “metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” to 
which Marx was referring, 1990 [1867]: 163). Such an analysis is supported by Jackson, 
and Pepper’s (2011) discussion of consumerism as a form of secular theodicy, wherein 
“theodicy” refers to “the attempt to come to terms with the existence of suffering and 
‘evil’ in our lives” (18). In the face of the suffering and “evil” consumers still experience 
in contemporary social relations, ethical commodities simultaneously offer hedonic 
pleasures and symbolic guarantees of “goodness.” Soper’s (2007) “alternate hedonism” is 
implicated yet again, wherein ethical commodities are consumed not only for altruistic 
reasons (e.g., social justice, environmentalism), but also because consumption is 
pleasurable in itself. Further, the pleasure taken in “moral selving” is a hedonic “moral 
reward” of such altruism (Soper 2007); it thus becomes impossible (or at least extremely 
difficult) to distinguish between these two ends of the spectrum (i.e., hedonism and 
altruism) in practice. 
 
2-3. The Historical Context of Ethical Consumption 
 The current literature on ethical consumption situates the practice within the 
contemporary context of what has been termed neoliberal governance (especially Miller 
and Rose 1997, and Rose 2008 [1999]) and risk society (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992). Rose 
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has indicated that under the regime of neoliberal government “it has become possible to 
govern without governing society – to govern through the ‘responsibilized’ and 
‘educated’ anxieties and aspirations of individuals and their families” (Rose 2008 [1999]: 
88). Government refers to government at a distance, through the actions of individual 
agents assumed to be rational and self-serving. Further, Miller and Rose (1997:1) have 
identified that “many diagnoses of our ‘postmodern condition’ hinge upon debates about 
consumption.” Neoliberal consumption refers therefore to the practice of governing 
individual consumers – and individuals consumers governing themselves – in and 
through their consumption.  
 In reference to consumer credit, Payne (2011) writes “neoliberalism referenced 
consumers as entrepreneurs; as such they would need access to finance, access not 
rationed by the availability of savings, but finance that could be granted by the creation of 
deposits against loans, priced on an assessment of risk” (121). Payne’s (2011) 
entrepreneurial consumer is this rational and self-interested agent assumed by neoliberal 
government at a distance, who is assumed to be fully aware of the risks of investment and 
credit (in this context). Thus the neoliberal consumer is one that is assumed to be fully 
aware of the consequences of his or her own consumption. 
 Connolly and Prothero (2008) incisively summarize Giddens’ (1991) and Beck’s 
(1992) understanding of what it means to live in a risk society:  
 that it is not that progress has not been achieved or that present-day life is 
 inherently more risky than was the case of previous eras. Rather, for lay 
 individuals as well as experts of specific fields, thinking in terms of risk and risk 
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 assessment is a more or less ever-present exercise of a partly imponderable 
 character. (122) 
Risk is not necessarily “higher” by any quantitative measure in the so-called risk society; 
the argument it is rather that subjects of risk society are more aware of risks now than in 
any prior epoch in history (Connolly and Prothero 2008, Giddens 1991, Beck 1991). 
Even if risk society refers to the prevalence of discourses of risk in general, I contend that 
when it comes to the risks of some unchecked, unreflexive, or uninformed consumption 
of the sort implied by ethical consumption as its opposite (i.e., purely egoistic 
consumption in the abstract), consumers have also never had as many options available in 
order to mitigate the perception of these risks. Connolly and Prothero (2008) refer to this 
as the moralizing tendency of ethical consumption, wherein consumers generate an “other 
consumption” that is worse for environmental or social reasons. The risks associated with 
consumption are not immediate dangers to consumers, but likewise more abstract risks 
associated with overconsumption, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution in 
general, long term decreases in quality of life, exploitation of labor, etc.  
 Ethical consumption shares many of the same rationalities of neoliberal 
governance and risk management as what has been termed “neoliberal conservation.” In 
their discussion of neoliberal conservation, Büscher et al. (2012) characterize 
“neoliberalism” as  “a political ideology that aims to subject political, social, and 
ecological affairs to capitalist dynamics” (5). Strategies of neoliberal conservation 
include “protected areas, education programs, ecotourism, mitigation offset schemes (like 
carbon credit systems), payment for ecosystem services, trade interventions, rewilding 
programs,” in an attempt to make conserving nature a profitable endeavor (Büscher et al. 
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2012: 7). In fact, despite the fact that the ecological contradiction of capitalism (i.e., that 
exploitation and extraction are responsible for ecological devastation, climate change, 
and biodiversity loss) was caused by market mechanisms, neoliberal conservation 
maintains not only that markets are the solution, but also that profit remains the only 
viable solution to saving nature (Büscher et al. 2012: 7). Ethical consumption, therefore, 
attempts to implicate the consumer in this production process by creating access to goods 
that remedy the past consequences of unrestrained overconsumption and the crises caused 
by such activity en mass. 
 In addition to this logic of conservation, neoliberalism has also rationalized the 
practices of charity and philanthropy as profit-driven endeavors. A term created by 
Bishop and Green (2008), “Philanthrocapitalism” is used by supporters and critics alike 
to refer to profit-oriented charity wherein “altruism is a useful business strategy” for 
affluent business owners (McGoey 2012: 187). McGoey (2012) further notes that such a 
conflation of profit and charity, of self-interest and the common good, has actually been 
prevalent since the moral philosophy of Adam Smith conflated individuals acting in their 
own self-interest as the best way to promote the common good. She maintains that the 
real contribution of neoliberal philanthrocapitalism to this rich history is that, perhaps for 
the first time, the explicit discourse of self-interest in the place of an implicit moral 
philosophy. Such philanthropy is “impact oriented, market-savvy and cost-effective… 
assum[ing] a moral hierarchy of philanthropic value that is structured according to 
measurable financial benefit” (McGoey 2012: 193). 
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2-4. Problematizing Governmentality 
 
 One of the limits of the governmentality approach to neoliberalism, as indicated 
by Soper (2007), is that it cannot distinguish between objective and subjective needs or 
responsibilities. Soper maintains that there is a “properly political type of need that can 
only legitimately be said to exist insofar as there is some experience and 
acknowledgement of it” (218). Thus, while neoliberalism is blamed for increasingly 
responsibilizing individuals for risk management (e.g., mitigating the effects of 
overconsumption by consuming better), such a responsibility is not necessarily 
experienced as anxiety inducing. To the extent that forms of ethical consumption like 
Tim Hortons Partnership Blend can help in mitigating this anxiety, it must also be stated 
that neoliberalism provides the historical conditions of possibility for the resolution of the 
anxieties that it generates. Such a pattern is the very content of neoliberal conservation, 
where in response to the detrimental ecological impact of past production practices in the 
pursuit of pure profit, conservation takes on the responsibility of remedying these crises 
while, all the while, still generating profit. 
 Further, I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective 
responsibilization is instructive precisely because, since neoliberalism defines the present 
structure of social relations as the historical condition of possibility for certain types of 
conscious (or unconscious) psychic activity, the “responsibilization” thesis of 
governmentality literature refers to an objective description of a particular modality of 
governing the subject. In neoliberalism, responsibilization occurs as an individual, in 
contrast to prior epochs wherein social welfare may have been the main mechanism of 
governance and responsibilization (Rose 1999). This conjecture corresponds with Rose’s 
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thesis that “freedom” represents a discursive technology that governs the subject in and 
through that freedom so that, for example, the freedom of consumer choice is actually a 
circumscribed kind of freedom that implies being governed in and through consumption 
(e.g., having credit, choosing to consume ethically, etc.). Responsibilization then 
becomes a hypothesis about the objective character of governance in a historical context, 
not the subject experience of that governance in that context. It thus becomes possible to 
speak of the paradoxical “objective” responsibilization of the consumer whilst 
maintaining that ethical consumption actually decreases the “subjectively” experienced 
anxiety of having to choose what and how to consume by guaranteeing the ethical (i.e., 
moral) efficacy of a particular commodity. 
 The goal of this thesis is to attempt to clarify how or in fact whether (if at all) the 
individual subject experiences this “objective” responsibilization from the standpoint of 
the consumption of ethical commodities. While the relationship of the commodity to the 
neoliberal conditions of production are characterized by commodity fetishism, and the 
relationship between the neoliberal conditions of production and the ethical consumer are 
at least objectively those of individuating ethical “responsibilization,” I will be working 
toward an understanding of the subjective experience of the consumer in relation to the 
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3. Data and Methods 
 This research employs a mixed methodological approach. The data constituting 
this study is drawn from the gap between the Coffee Partnership Program as it is detailed 
on Tim Hortons’ website and the advertising for the Partnership Blend of coffee, which 
does not contain the same information. Since the campaign for the Partnership Blend of 
coffee does not reference the goals (pillars) of the larger program within which it is 
situated, it functions as a fetish concealing the void between not only the commodity 
itself (i.e., a bag of Partnership Blend coffee) and the labor involved in its production 
(i.e., coffee farming), but also the commodity and the market logic imposed upon the 
conservation and humanitarian efforts advanced in the Partnership Program. 
 The Partnership Blend Coffee advertising proclaims, in keeping with the larger 
umbrella of Tim Hortons’ commitment to “Making a True Difference,” that “Tim 
Hortons Partnership Blend” is “Making a true difference in coffee-growing 
communities.” In order to achieve this goal,  “$1 from every purchase helps support our 
Coffee Partnership Program.” The page introducing consumers to the Parnership Blend 
proclaims that “The goal of Tim Hortons Coffee Partnership is to improve the lives of 
small-scale coffee farmers by increasing the productivity of their farms and the quality of 
their beans in an environmentally sustainable way.”  
 The information in this advertising for the Partnership Blend will be compared 
and contrasted to the broader information provided about Tim Hortons’ Coffee 
Partnership program. The information about the Coffee Partnership program goes in to 
more detail about the specific policy directives of Tim Hortons on the ground in the 
regions that the program operates. These descriptions will enable a demonstration of how 
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the Coffee Partnership program constitutes a neoliberal business endeavor in order to 
situate my discussion of what it is (or rather, what it is not) that the consumer knows (or 
does not know) about the Partnership Blend Coffee that he or she has purchased. 
 My discussion of ethical consumer consciousness will be situated within the case 
study of Tim Hortons Partnership Blend Coffee and the historical context of 
neoliberalism. It will be theoretical, drawing from the Marxian and psychoanalytic 
understandings of fetishism outlined in the literature review above. Broadly speaking, my 
method is thus one that could be characterized as a dialectic between a phenomenology of 
ethical consumption and the historical (and cultural) conditions of possibility in which 
ethical consumption arises. This phenomenological account is further problematized by 
the relation of the subject’s desire to the experience of the object itself (i.e., the 
Partnershp Blend Coffee) and the efficacy of that object in generating a pleasurable 
experience of moral self-identity (i.e., moral-selving).  
 Such an analysis will necessarily be textual, relying on the text evidence provided 
by Tim Hortons on their website. As indicated in the literature review, there is, in fact, an 
empirical precedent set wherein “ethical” (e.g., “green”) consumers have, in qualitative 
ethnographic research, articulated an ambiguity around “normal,” “other” consumption 
that was not articulated about ethical commodities (Connolly and Prothero 2008, Adams 
and Raisborough’s 2010). Such an absence provides the basis for an elaboration of a 
theory of ethical consumer consciousness that can account for this tendency observed in 
ethnographic research. 
 Thus, I question the basis upon which claims to “ethicality” are made on two 
counts, namely: 1) A critique of contemporary ethical production practices, provided 
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mainly in the literature review above and; 2) A critique of “ethicality” implicating the 
tension between the desire to be moral and the pleasure taken in that act of moral-selving 
in Tim Hortons ethical consumption campaign. 
 Tim Hortons is by no means an “ethical” corporation, that is, not everything it 
does is toward “ethical” ends. It is, after all, a corporate business in pursuit of profits. 
Alongside the Partnership Blend Coffee, Tim Hortons continues to offer its popular 
(cheaper, and by comparison implicitly unethical or at least anethical) regular ground 
coffee. Thus, my case study is limited to only one campaign and not an entire business 
ethic. However, due to its existence across this distinction between ethical and other (or 
normal) consumption, it serves as an interesting and generative entry point into the 
narratives of ethical consumption vis-á-vis consumer’s experiences of consumption as 
either morally rewarding or otherwise. Further research will need to be conducted into 
other ethical business models and campaigns in order to determine the extent of the 
proliferation of such narratives guaranteeing moral rewards to ethical consumers and any 
problematic dynamics or results that arise out of this potential self-understanding.  
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4. Analysis 
 The Tim Hortons Coffee Partnership Program is a three-part neoliberal campaign 
that combines together elements of neoliberal conservation, philanthrocapitalism, and the 
profit logic of markets. The three pillars of the program, couched within the context of 
the broader campaign of Tim Hortons to “Make a True Difference,” reveal that it is 
situated within this historical context. In order to situate a theory of consumer 
consciousness within this historical context using the case study of Tim Hortons Coffee 
Partnership Program, I will first demonstrate, with reference to the three pillars of the 
program, that the program is, in fact, an extension of this neoliberal rationality. I will then 
move from this general classification in to an account of how the Partnership Blend 
Coffee campaign and commodity acts as a fetish not only concealing not only the 
neoliberal processes of production of this particular commodity, but also guaranteeing the 
moral value of this commodity. 
 
4-1. Tim Hortons: “Making a [Neoliberal] Difference” 
 The first pillar of the Tim Hortons Partnership Program is the economic pillar, 
which claims that Tim Hortons helps “coffee farmers earn a better living by training them 
to be better farmers and run better businesses” (2012). Perhaps nowhere else is the 
neoliberal imperative of profit thrown in to sharper relief than it is in this pillar of the 
program. “Successful” coffee farmers must be “better business people” (Tim Hortons 
2012); there are no other criteria for success mentioned within the information for this 
pillar. As part of this paradigm, “Coffee farmers learn a wide array of skills to help 
increase the quality and the yield of their coffee crops. This, in turn, provides them with a 
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better income. They also learn to run their farms like businesses, increasing their 
profitability and long-term sustainability” (Tim Hortons 2012). 
 Two strategies that Tim Hortons lists for implementing the change implied by the 
economic pillar are 1) “Establishing technical training in agronomy and farm 
management to improve the quantity and quality of coffee produced,” and 2) “Helping 
farmers organize into larger groups within their communities to reduce costs and ensure 
their coffee gets to market at the best time and at the best price.” (2012). In addition to 
the colonial/historical undertones of this project (which, while important, are beyond the 
scope of this analysis), the economic pillar explicitly organizes production according to 
the rationalities of efficacy and corporate structures. Quality and quantity must be 
improved, and farmers must move toward a formal organization of individual coffee 
farmers into cohesive groups. The economic pillar corresponds to neoliberal 
philanthrocapitalism such that “helping people” becomes synonymous with “helping 
people help themselves,” which translates into “making better businesspeople”; a failure 
to make self-sufficient, industrious capitalists would imply failure of the program. 
 It is worth noting that everywhere on the Partnership Program website, the 
economic pillar is the first pillar: in side menus, in text boxes, and in infographics. 
Though it would be perhaps presumptuous to state that the economic pillar is the most 
important pillar to Tim Hortons’ entire project in the regions in which it operates, as Tim 
Hortons never explicitly states this anywhere on the website, there is privileging of the 
economic pillar that is implied by this recurrent structuring; the social and environmental 
pillars (roughly corresponding to philanthropy and conservation) are subjugated, or at 
least secondary, to the market logic of the economic pillar. 
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 The second (and, as noted, perhaps secondary) pillar of the Coffee Partnership 
Program is the social pillar, which “empower[s] youth and improve[es] the education of 
children of coffee farmers so they have the opportunity for a better future” (Tim Hortons 
2012). This pillar relies heavily on the dense symbolic and affective meanings of children 
and childhood – meanings that Edelman (2005 [2004]) attempts to subvert and 
problematize in his account of reproductive futurism. Quite explicitly, Tim Hortons 
avows this futurism when it states, “the future of a coffee farming community, like any 
other community, depends on its children” (2012). By working with Junior Achievement 
(JA), Tim Hortons enters into relationships with local schools in the Trifinio region “to 
provide aspiring youth with the skills they need to become successful entrepreneurs and 
leaders in their communities” (2012, emphasis mine). 
 Thus there is a paternalistic undertone that mirrors the colonial tone of the 
economic pillar, wherein Tim Hortons and JA determine the content that corresponds to 
the improvement of the social conditions in the regions of the Partnership Program, 
namely learning the skills of and capacities associated with 1) entrepreneurship, and 2) 
individualism. A indication that the Partnership Progam has been successful would be 
that future generations of coffee farmers become either better business people, or better 
community leaders in a context where “better” refers to “more amenable to business 
imperatives.” Thus Tim Hortons, and neoliberal philanthrocapitalist enterprises, create 
the conditions of possibility for future profit in the region by training children that will, 
hopefully, welcome such profit-seeking endeavors back with open arms1. 
                                                
1 There is also an interesting comparison to be made between the neoliberal educational rationality or 
paradigm of skills “training” versus critical thinking; this distinction is beyond the scope of the current 
analysis, but could perhaps serve as the basis for future investigations into such programs. 
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 Third, and finally (tertiary?), the environmental pillar refers to Tim Hortons 
policy around “educating coffee farmers and helping them adopt more environmentally 
sound and sustainable coffee farming practices” (2012). Such language sets up the 
farmers like “imagined primitives” that are unaware of the environmental impact of 
“modern production” processes (West 2012). The images conjured by this language is of 
farmers overworking their fields and scorching their earth in order to gratify themselves 
immediately instead of guaranteeing their own long term sustenance, and of a beneficent 
and benevolent (again, at once colonial and paternal) corporation that hopes to convince 
them to adhere to sustainable production practices for their own sake. There is no 
mention of either 1) the pressure exerted upon farmers by industry to adopt modern 
production practices that could be detrimental to the environment, or 2) the desire farmers 
may have already to produce in ways such that they do not compromise the relationship 
they desire with their environment (ecology, biodiversity, climate etc.). 
 Again, Tim Hortons relies on “Training” which “covers soil analysis for effective 
fertilizer use, elimination of harmful pesticides, the importance of shade, conservation of 
biodiversity and soil-erosion prevention strategies” (2012). Further, “one of the most 
important areas of focus in this category is water – one of the coffee farmer’s most 
precious resources” (Tim Hortons 2012). All of these strategies for protecting the 
regions’ environment and creating sustainable coffee production practices are listed as if 
they refer to production practices that emerged out of a vacuum inhabited by the less 
enlightened coffee farmers. There is no mention of how fertilizers and pesticides, for 
example, reached these coffee farmers, and the types of incentives made available to 
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coffee farmers in the past for adopting them (aside from increased production at the cost 
of environmental degradation). 
 “Making a True Difference,” then, ironically refers to doing things exactly the 
same way that every other neoliberal organization would do them within these three 
contexts (i.e., the three pillars of economy, society, and environment, and their particular 
neoliberal market, charity, and conservation logics). There is, as yet, no indication of Tim 
Hortons’ sense of success or efficacy with the Coffee Partnership program available on 
the website apart from the more abstract numbers of relationships that were cited in the 
introduction to this thesis (i.e., that Tim Hortons has worked with over 3 400 farmers and 
influenced the lives of over 17 000 people). However, the pillars of the program itself 
reveal enough of what Tim Hortons would conceive of as “success” to be able to 
formulate an account of why it constitutes a neoliberal intervention in production, 
philanthropy, and conservation. 
  
4-2. A Partner in the Program: Morally Implicating the Ethical Consumer 
 The central premise of this analysis of consumer consciousness is that consumers 
who choose to consume ethically would prefer moral certitude as the basis of their moral-
selving rather than the moral ambiguity of a lack of moral guarantees. Such a claim 
appeals to a notion of “alternate hedonism” (Soper 2007) wherein there is an individual 
pleasure taken in moral-selving (even though morality is paradoxically altruistic in its 
axiomatic formulations) and also to a notion of the ambivalence associated with moral 
ambiguity being an unpleasant or even painful personal experience. Such a notion of 
ambivalence is advanced by Gould (2001) in her analysis of ambivalence as a condition 
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of possibility for social movements: ambivalence is an unpleasant affective state 
characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity from which individuals would prefer to be 
relieved or removed. 
 An important caveat to the following analysis is that it does not attempt to argue 
that what appears as moral to a consumer subject is, conversely, immoral; despite the fact 
that ambiguity, uncertainty, and ambivalence are conceived as unpleasant emotions, this 
analysis will proceed as indifferent to any actual claims about what is or is not moral or 
ethical. As such this analysis will only serve as the conditions of possibility for future 
political or ethical arguments, which is why this description serves only as a “towards” of 
an account of consumer consciousness. 
 I will begin, most superficially, by pointing out that any consumer that partakes in 
the Coffee Partnership Program equipped only with the information provided by the 
advertising for Partnership Blend Coffee would have no idea that the Coffee Partnership 
Program operates according to these three policy pillars, let alone that these pillars could 
be so problematic. Though they do not mobilize the language of fetishism, Adams and 
Raisborough (2010) and Connolly and Prothero (2008) both mention, in passing, that 
consumers of ethical or green commodities may disagree morally with the very neoliberal 
rationality of contemporary production, but such knowledge is concealed by: 1) the 
appearance of the commodity apart from the context of its social relations of production, 
and; 2) they speculate, based upon their limited ethnographic data, the pleasure taken in 
the “moral rewards” (Soper 2007) of consuming otherwise. 
 For this analysis, the most important dimension of this campaign and product line 
is that the consumer is directly and morally implicated within the “partnership” by the $1 
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from each purchase that goes toward Tim Hortons’ Coffee Partnership Program. At the 
very least, this symbolic gesture of $1 from each purchase permits or creates the 
conditions of possibility for moral selving. 
 The rhetoric of the “Making a True Difference” campaign is particularly striking: 
there is no explicit discussion of what it might mean to make a “false difference,” or the 
difference between a “True Difference” and simply “difference.” The campaign provides 
the narrative conditions of possibility for a consumer to conceive of him- or herself as 
making a difference that is implicitly more authentic than another consumer choice. In 
Carrier’s (2010) words, “ethicality” refers to the symbolic efficacy in conjuring an image 
that it is “used to represent a state of affairs that satisf[ies] ethical criteria[,] mak[ing] that 
satisfaction legible and com[ing] to define these criteria” (677). Ostensibly, the phrase 
“Making a True Difference” stands in for the more normative “Doing Good,” because 
Tim Hortons would likely not want to advertise that it is making a difference by 
destroying the environments, economies, or social institutions of its partners (if that were 
the case). The $1 from each consumer purchase of the “Partnership Blend” supposedly 
entitles the consumer to the sense of “Doing Good” that the “Coffee Partnership 
Program” packages with its campaign. 
 Furthermore, the word “partnership,” though most obviously referring to the 
business partnership between Tim Hortons and its farmers, also stands as a fetish 
concealing the void between the consumer and the farmer; “partnership” shortens the 
space morally and spatially between the point of production and the point of 
consumption. The consumer is permitted to see him- or herself as entering into a 
relationship with the farmer that is mediated by the act of exchange (consumption). As 
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Žižek has stated in the context of a discussion of Tom’s Shoes “One for One” program 
(wherein for ever pair of shoes you buy, Tom’s Shoes will give one pair to a child living 
in poverty), “in the very consumerist act you buy your redemption from being a 
consumerist [sic]”: charity and vindication become internal to the logic of cultural 
capitalism (“RSA” 2009). The partnership between the consumer’s act of consumption 
and the farmer’s economic, social, and environmental conditions is one in which both 
consumer and farmer ostensibly come out ahead: the consumer, morally, and the farmer, 
financially, in a stronger community, with an intact environment. 
 The three pillars of the “Coffee Partnership Program” attempt to secure one’s 
future both morally and in terms of the capacity to continue to consume (coffee, at least) 
by supporting the children of the farmers in coffee growing countries. One of the main 
goals of the “social” pillar of the program is “empowering youth and improving 
education of the children of coffee farmers so they have the opportunity for a better 
future” (Tim Hortons 2012). This “social pillar” is a clear distillation of the combination 
of “reproductive futurism” (Edelman 2005) and “consumptive futurism,” though the 
reproductive justification is displaced: one ensures that, by consuming, the future 
generations of coffee farmers lead better lives (i.e., higher standard of living, quality of 
life as quantitative measurements), and be more empowered and more effective business 
people. The business imperative of the program is covered by the economic pillar, 
wherein Tim Hortons ensures us it is “helping coffee farmers earn a better living by 
training them to be better farmers and run better businesses” (2012). There is, of course, a 
naïve assumption made that, regardless of how “educated” the children of farmers may 
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become, there will still be someone to grow my (i.e, Tim Hortons’ and the consumer’s) 
coffee. 
  
  42 
5. Conclusion 
 Citing an unknown speaker, Jameson (2003) has remarked, “it is easier to imagine 
the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” (76). The implication of this 
statement is that the symbolic coordinates that serve as the conditions of possibility for 
rendering reality intelligible to the subject are those provided by the social relations under 
capitalism, and in particular its more recent forms in neoliberalism and ethical 
consumption. He adds further that the current critical project is to “revise that [statement] 
and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world” 
(Jameson 2003: 76). This second statement directly confronts the fact that neoliberal, 
consumer capitalism is currently imagined as the solution to the world ending, that is to 
say, that one confronts the end of the world by embracing capitalism and consumption. 
Neoliberal business, philanthropic, and conservation efforts demonstrate the sentiment 
that the best solution to the crises generated by historical capitalism is more (and better) 
capitalism. Ethical consumption represents the individuated mechanism through which 
consumers are implicated in this matrix of renewal. 
 The preceding analysis has demonstrated that ethical consumption is a mechanism 
whereby consumers construct and maintain a sense of a moral self through “moral-
selving” (Barnett et al. 2005), the modality of which is ethical consumption. The 
implication of the consumer directly within the purchase of Tim Hortons Partnership 
Blend Coffee through the concept of “Partner” and the conflation of “True” with “Good” 
creates the conditions of possibility for those consumers to conceive of themselves as 
moral selves. Additionally, such an act of moral-selving is complicated by the pleasurable 
moral rewards (Soper 2007) generated by understanding oneself as a moral self. Soper’s 
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(2007) concept of “alternate hedonism” attempts to respect this complexity in the 
dynamic between hedonism and altruism by permitting both to exist in concert and 
tension with on another. Consumption, itself already conceived as a hedonistic and selfish 
activity, is mobilized in the name of altruistic ends through ethical consumption. This 
relationship is constituted in such a way that through morality – generally conceived as 
altruistic and, indeed, pleasure-denying – individual ethical consumers may take an 
“alternate” pleasure in the “moral rewards of consuming sustainably” (Soper 2007: 212). 
It does so always already within a context of neoliberalism that takes individualism, 
profit, and personal responsibility as given moral values (or at the very least normative 
behaviors). 
 This thesis has also shown that the responsibilization thesis of governmentality 
literature about neoliberalism (very usefully) describes a particular, individuating 
modality of responsibilizing the individual through his or her consumption by governing 
at a distance (Rose 1999, and Miller and Rose 1997), this description is only of the 
conditions of possibility structuring consciousness, and not necessarily a conscious 
experience directly. 
 An account of such consciousness in these conditions requires a theoretical and 
conceptual tool that allows for an explanation of a paradoxically decreased experience of 
the anxieties that would be associated with increased knowledge of risk (Beck 1992, and 
Giddens 1991) and of individuating responsibilization in this context that reckons with 
the (admittedly) preliminary ethnographic data generated about ethical consumption 
(most notably Connolly and Prothero 2008, and Adams and Raisborough’s 2010). I have 
argued that an account of fetishism that goes beyond a description of the social relations 
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of production into a psychoanalytic understanding of the subjective and psychic 
experience of fetishism may reveal such insight.  
 Whether or not a psychoanalytically nuanced notion of fetishism inevitably 
reveals more about the effects of ethical consumption in the constitution of self-identity, 
the ethical and political consequences of such activity must be further theorized. I have 
attempted to omit these consequences in favor of describing the relationship between the 
consumer and the ethical commodity directly. Though geographers and political 
economists (e.g., Lewis and Potter 2011, Coles and Crang 2011, Barnett et al. 2005) have 
doubtless done a fantastic job describing and problematizing the space and relations 
between an ethical commodity and its production in a certain historical context – namely 
neoliberalism, with all that contexts’ biases and presumptions – the space between the 
consumer and the ethical commodity remains under-theorized in favor of ethnographic 
data. A notion of fetishism as an object that conceals a lack of symbolic guarantees by 
saturating that object with affective and moral value (e.g., economic flourishing, 
socializing children properly, and protecting the environment, the three pillars of the 
Coffee Partnership Program) begins to theorize this constitutive gap between consumer 
experiences and production realities in such a way as to pave the way for ethical and 
political potentialities and problematizations.  
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